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SUMMARY
All the excitement around the great possibilities that the opening of the Northwest Passage could 
offer the shipping industry — and Canada — could not last. Just a few years ago, as sea ice in the 
North seemed to be steadily melting away, observers were eagerly tallying up the savings in time, 
fuel and costs that a reliably ice-free route across the top of the planet would provide for shippers. 
A couple of trial runs only confirmed that for shipments from Asia to Europe or North America, or 
the other way around, the route could shave thousands of kilometres off each trip, compared to 
journeys through the Suez or Panama canals. Rapid growth in shipping traffic across the Northwest 
Passage and its sister route, the Northern Sea Route, seemed not just inevitable, but imminent.
Just a short while later, it now seems neither imminent nor inevitable. The retreat in sea ice may 
persist, but it is evident that due to regular fluctuations in ice coverage, the Northwest Passage 
will not be reliably ice-free for many, many years, if ever. Shipping may be more possible through 
the Northwest Passage than it was in the past, but it will not be consistently unobstructed. The 
challenges of ice combined with Arctic weather conditions may well mean that any shipping 
through the passage is slower than expected. Other complicating factors include uncharted or 
poorly charted sea lanes and the difficulty in securing insurance for Arctic shipping.
At the same time, the competition from alternate routes is only becoming more intense, with 
expansions in both the Suez and Panama Canals and the potential for a new canal across Nicaragua. 
Regarding the Northwest Passage, Canada lacks much of the infrastructure in the North that 
would make Arctic passage a strong competitor, including multiple ports enroute and sufficient 
icebreaking equipment.
There are still advantages that might draw some shipping away from traditional routes to the 
northern passages, particularly for the movement of western resources to growing Asian markets. 
But even moderate levels of shipping through the Northwest Passage do have the potential to 
change Canada’s relationship with its Asian trading partners, especially China. The Canadian and 
Chinese governments share a number of priorities regarding the Arctic, including environmental 
protection, safer navigation and resource development. These will provide opportunities for more 
dialogue and engagement between the two countries. While the Northwest Passage may not 
become the important trans-shipment route to Asia once imagined by enthusiastic observers, the 
most meaningful impact that a more useful route may provide is to alter, and improve, the course 
of Canada’s relations in the Asia-Pacific region.
1This paper seeks to examine likely developments and trends in Arctic shipping given the 
shrinkage of the polar ice cap, and to situate these trends in the broader context of changing 
global maritime and trade realities with particular focus on their impact on trade with Asia. 
There are implications for Canada and its relations with Asia, especially China, that flow 
from these developments. 
SHRINKAGE OF THE ICE CAP
In 2014, Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse published their study “On Uncertain Ice: The Future 
of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage,”1 concluding that, for a variety of reasons, 
it is unlikely that the Northwest Passage (NWP) will emerge as a viable trans-shipping 
route in the foreseeable future. Their paper serves as a response to the enthusiasm that has 
been generated, in part through the popular press, regarding the prospects for northern 
navigation brought about by the shrinking Arctic cap. Attention has been drawn to the 
possibilities of using the Northwest Passage as a trans-shipment route from the eastern 
Atlantic seaboard and Europe to Asia by the fact that the polar ice cap has receded by 
about 30 per cent since the 1980s2 so that, in most summers, ice-free shipping lanes exist 
across the breadth of the Arctic. As early as 1969, the U.S. oil tanker Manhattan transited 
the Northwest Passage (accompanied by a self-appointed Canadian icebreaker). Beginning 
around the year 2000, several transits of the NWP started to take place annually, often 
by small yachts, and the frequency of such passages has increased significantly in recent 
years.3 This is especially happening in the NWP’s sister passage, the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR).4 
The term “Northern Sea Route” is today commonly used to refer to the sea route along the 
northern coast of Siberia. It is also at times referred to as the “Northeast Passage” in order 
to differentiate it from the Northwest Passage. Both the Northeast and Northwest passages 
represent a Eurocentric interpretation of the world, since they are, respectively, northeast 
and northwest of Western Europe. While the term Northeast Passage is used less frequently 
today, Northwest Passage remains the normal term used to designate the Arctic sea route 
connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans through the northern reaches of Canada.
1 Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage” 
(Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy Institute, December 2014). 
2 
There are various estimates of the extent of the receding icepack, although they all indicate a significant reduction over 
the past 35 years. A NASA report estimates that “multi-year” ice (i.e., ice that has made it through at least two summers) 
is receding by about 15 per cent per decade. See NASA, “NASA Finds Thickest Parts of Arctic Ice Cap Melting Faster,” 
February 29, 2012, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/thick-melt.html. Another report puts the loss of sea-ice 
cover at as much as 40 per cent since measurement began in 1979. See Denise Chow, “Shrinking Arctic Ice Will Lead to 
Ice-Free Summers,” LiveScience, August 23, 2013, http://www.livescience.com/39147-arctic-sea-ice-melting.html. A more 
conservative estimate comes from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) based at the University of Colorado. 
The NSIDC reports that “February 2016 sea ice extent was the lowest in the satellite record at 14.22 million square 
kilometers (5.48 million square miles). The linear rate of decline for February is now 3.0 percent per decade.” Arctic Sea 
Ice News and Analysis, “Another record low for Arctic sea ice maximum winter extent,” https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/. 
The discrepancies are in part explained by the fact that measurements are taken at different times of the year. 
3 R.K. Headland, “Transits of the Northwest Passage to the End of the 2014 Navigation Season” (Scott Polar Research 
Institute, October 14, 2014), http://www.americanpolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NWP-2014-X-5-layout-for-PDF.pdf.
4 
Northern Sea Route Information Office website, “Transit Statistics,” http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits.
2Accessed at ArcticEcon: https://arcticecon.wordpress.com/tag/northern-sea-route/.
While the ice pack is receding in the Arctic, the shrinkage is not in a linear progression 
from more to less ice. While there is a steady downward trend, in any given year ice 
conditions can be more severe at particular times than in previous years. The overall record 
low for the ice pack was in 2012, closely followed by 2011 and 2007.5 Ice then increased in 
the two following years, with 2014 having more difficult ice conditions than a year earlier. 
The extent of the permanent sea ice declined again in 2015, although it was significantly 
greater than the record lows of other years. While it may be safe to suggest that Arctic 
routes are now more likely to be open than in the past, it is very difficult to predict exactly 
what shipping conditions will be from year to year, and at any time in any given month, 
although the general trend is for more navigation over longer periods of time. 
ARCTIC-SEA-ICE PREDICTIONS
Accessed at Princeton University Forrestal Campus, Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory:  
http://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/arctic-sea-ice-predictions.
5 Arctic Sea Ice News and Analysis, “Another record low for Arctic sea ice maximum winter extent,” September 15, 2015, 
http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/. In comparing which year had the record low ice pack, it depends on which month is being 
measured. The record low for September was in 2012; for October, it occurred in 2007. 
3SHORTER DISTANCES OF THE ARCTIC ROUTES
Several years ago, because of widespread reports of the shrinking ice cap and after oil 
tankers and bulk carriers made successful trial runs, popular imagination was aroused 
by the concept of using the northern passages as a shorter alternative to what were then 
pirate-infested waters off the coast of Somalia and as a way to bypass narrow straits 
that could potentially be closed in times of conflict, such as the Straits of Malacca. The 
distance comparisons with traditional routes are striking. For shipping between Asia and 
northern Europe, the distance savings are in the order of 7,635 kilometres from Yokohama 
to Rotterdam via the NSR as opposed to using the Suez Canal (12,982 versus 21,759 
kilometres, or about 37 per cent in distance savings), and 4,650 kilometres from Shanghai 
to Rotterdam (14,901 versus 19,551 kilometres, or 24 per cent in distance savings)6. It is 
worth noting that as the point of departure moves further west, for example from Shanghai 
to Singapore, the advantages of the northern routes disappear. For the NWP, the distance 
savings for the Yokohama-Rotterdam route via the Canadian Arctic versus transiting 
through Panama are equally impressive, with a distance savings of over 7,500 kilometres 
(15,700 versus 23,300 kilometres). Using the NWP route produces a saving in distance of 
about 3,500 kilometres from Shanghai to Rotterdam and 3,850 kilometres from Shanghai to 
New York.7 The distance saved clearly depends on the port of embarkation and destination, 
but in almost all cases involving ports in north China, Japan and Korea, savings in distance 
and, in theory, time, are significant. One study estimates that the comparative distances 
from “East Asia” to “western Europe” are 21,000 kilometres via the Suez Route versus 
12,800 on the NSR, and 24,000 kilometres via Panama versus 13,600 via the NWP.8 
“IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE” REGARDING EARLY EXPANSION OF  
ARCTIC ROUTES
Based on the propositions of less ice and shorter distances, the media and some experts 
have predicted rapid growth in using the northern routes for shipping to and from Asia. For 
example, in July 2011, The Guardian ran a story headlined “Thawing Arctic opens up new 
shipping routes on the roof of the world,” and quoted Viktor Basargin, Russia’s regional 
development minister, who predicted that cargo shipments on the NSR could rise from 
three million to thirty million tons “in the near future.”9 A tenfold increase was, to say the 
least, ambitious — but unrealistic, given that traffic in 2015 barely exceeded five million 
6 Albert Buixadé Farré et al., “Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, 
technology, and infrastructure,” Polar Geography 37, 4 (October 16, 2014): 5, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
pdf/10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769. The distances in the reference document are in nautical miles and have been converted 
to kilometres for internal consistency. 
7 Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain,” 6.
8 Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “The Geography of Transportation Systems,” Department of Global Studies and Geography, Hofstra 
University, https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch1en/conc1en/polarroutes.html.
9 Terry Macalister, “Thawing Arctic opens up new shipping routes on the ‘roof of the world,’” The Guardian, July 5, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jul/05/arctic-shipping-trade-routes. 
4tons.10 A month later, in August 2011, the BBC enthused that “Arctic sea routes open as ice 
melts,” noting that “shipping companies are already enjoying the benefits these routes may 
bring if they remain open regularly.” The BBC quoted Peter Wadhams, an Arctic ice expert 
from the University of Cambridge speaking to the effect that the advent of summers when 
routes are routinely open “is not far away.” 11 
These enthusiastic accounts were fed by reports of new developments in Arctic shipping. In 
2011, the tanker ST1 Heritage left Murmansk on July 19 with 61,000 tons of gas condensate 
that was delivered to a port in Thailand on August 16, with an eight-day passage through 
the Northern Sea Route.12 This was followed by the Vladimir Tikhonov a month later 
with a larger cargo, shaving a half-day off the passage.13 The enthusiasm was not limited 
to Europe. Two years later, The Globe and Mail reported that the melting Arctic offered a 
new world of shipping and resource opportunities. The Globe reprinted an article from the 
Financial Times that stated confidently “melting has cleared large ocean stretches of ice for 
much of the year. This is opening up new shipping lanes as well as prospects for resource 
exploitation in a part of the world that only years ago was deemed too inhospitable” 
(emphasis added).14 
ASIAN INTEREST IN THE ARCTIC
Of all the Asian states, the one that has evinced the most interest and has the most active 
Arctic program is China. The 2012 voyage of the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long (Snow 
Dragon) to Iceland via the Northern Sea Route (returning via the Transpolar Sea Route)15 
raised further expectations about regular use of the route. It was reported that, according 
to Chinese scenarios, five to 15 per cent of China’s international trade, mostly container 
traffic, would be using Arctic routes by 2020.16 In 2013, the 19,000-ton Chinese general 
cargo vessel Yong Sheng became the first container-carrying ship to traverse the NSR. 
COSCO, the ship’s owner, reported that the Yong Sheng made the transit from Taicang, 
China (near Shanghai) to Rotterdam in 27 days, travelling 7,800 nautical miles, which was 
nine days and 2,800 nautical miles shorter than the route through the Straits of Malacca 
10 
“Cargo traffic on Northern Sea Route goes up by 1.2 million tons in 2015,” The Arctic, December 8, 2015, http://arctic.ru/
infrastructure/20151208/251526.html. Ambitious goals are still being put forward (see: “Russian PM orders plan to increase 
Northern Sea Route capacity by 20 times,” Russia Today, June 8, 2015, https://www.rt.com/business/265756-northern-sea-
route-medvedev/).
11 Richard Black, “Arctic sea routes open as ice melts,” BBC, August 25, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-
environment-14670433.
12 Willi Ostreng et al., Shipping in Arctic Waters: A Comparison of the Northeast, Northwest and Trans Polar Passages  
(New York: Springer-Praxis, 2013), 186.
13 “Tanker Vladimir Tikhonov Completes Successful Northern Sea Route Transit in a Week,” The Maritime Executive, 
September 1, 2011, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/tanker-vladimir-tikhonov-completes-successful-northern-
sea-route-transit-in-a-week.
14 “In the melting Arctic, a new world of shipping and resource opportunities,” The Globe and Mail, August 12, 2013,  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/in-the-melting-arctic-a-new-world-of-shipping-
and-resource-opportunities/article13713662/.
15 The Transpolar Sea Route is the shortest of all the northern routes, cutting across the polar ice cap rather than following 
either the coasts of Siberia or Canada. Because of the thickness of ice, it is the least used and least likely to become a viable 
commercial route, but is navigable at certain times of the year by heavy icebreakers such as the Xue Long. 
16 “China starts commercial use of Northern Sea Route,” Barents Observer, March 14, 2013. 
5and the Suez Canal.17 The Yong Sheng made a second return trip in 2015 and COSCO has 
announced that it is “actively studying the feasibility of operating regular services on the 
northern route” with regular Asia to Europe sailings.18
 Many of China’s activities are conducted by the Arctic and Antarctic Administration 
based in Beijing, affiliated with the State Oceanic Administration and the well-funded 
Chinese Polar Research Institute in Shanghai, which has maintained a High Arctic research 
station in Svalbard, Norway since 2004. In addition to the icebreaker Xue Long, acquired 
from Ukraine in 1993, China is building its own heavy icebreaker, which is expected to 
be in service in 2016. Furthermore, China signed a free-trade agreement with Iceland 
in 2013 and the same year achieved its goal of obtaining official observer status at the 
Arctic Council,19 along with several other Asian states. China’s Arctic strategy is multi-
faceted, encompassing scientific research, particularly with respect to the impact on the 
environment of the melting Arctic ice cap, exploration and exploitation of resources, and 
shipping and trade routes.20
Although China is not the only Asian state to have obtained observer status in the Arctic 
Council,21 it is the one that arouses the most interest and concern. China, as with the other 
states admitted as observers, agreed to follow a number of principles established by the 
permanent members22 such as recognizing the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
in the Arctic of the Arctic states, and accepting the legal framework that applies to the 
Arctic Ocean, including the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (among others).23 
However, it would be disingenuous to pretend that China’s flexing of its Arctic muscles does 
not engender some anxiety, if only because of China’s size and global aspirations.24 China 
(along with India) has taken the position that the Arctic belongs to all people and the region 
is part of the “common heritage of mankind.”25 
17 “COSCO Voyage Yong Sheng arrives in the Netherlands,” Xinhuanet, September 11, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/photo/2013-09/11/c_132711222_2.htm.
18 Costas Paris and Joanne Chiu, “Chinese Shipping Group COSCO Planning Regular Trans-Arctic Sailings,” The Wall 
Street Journal, October 29, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-shipper-cosco-to-schedule-regular-trans-arctic-
sailings-1446133485.
19 The Arctic Council was established on September 19, 1996, with the signing of the Ottawa Declaration. The Ottawa 
Declaration lists the following countries as members of the Arctic Council: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States. In addition, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have status as 
permanent participants. The Ottawa Declaration gives the Arctic Council a broad mandate to address issues of relevance 
to the Arctic region and its peoples. During its first 20 years, the Arctic Council focused much of its work on issues of 
sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. Arctic Council website, http://www.arctic-council.org/
index.php/en/.
20 Bree Feng, “China Looks North: Carving Out a Role in the Arctic,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada: Canada-Asia 
Agenda (April 30, 2015), https://www.asiapacific.ca/canada-asia-agenda/china-looks-north-carving-out-role-arctic.
21 The others, also admitted in 2013, are Japan, Korea, India and Singapore. 
22 The permanent members of the Arctic Council are those listed in the previously mentioned Ottawa Declaration: Russia, 
Canada, the U.S., Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden.
23 Arctic Council, “Criteria for Admitting Observers,” May 7, 2015, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/
arctic-council/observers.
24 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada and the Asian Observers to the Arctic Council: Anxiety and Opportunity,” National 
Bureau of Asian Research, Asia Policy 18 (July 2014), 22-29. 
25 
Kathryn Keil, “A Potential Arctic Conflict II: Insiders vs Outsiders” The Arctic Institute (October 25, 2011),  
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2011/10/2378-actual-arctic-conflict-arctic.html.
6Given its role on the world stage it would be surprising if China did not assert its interests 
in the Arctic, which it can easily justify by reference to the impact of climate change in 
the Arctic on the Chinese environment, among other considerations. Access to resources 
and shipping lanes are equally important.26 China, as a major trading nation with blue-
water naval ambitions, will not only want to play a role in determining the future of Arctic 
shipping lanes but will demonstrate its capacity to do so. 
COMING BACK TO EARTH
If the media enthusiasm for Arctic shipping routes waxed in the period 2011–13 and earlier, 
it waned somewhat thereafter and the initial excitement began to be tempered with a dose 
of reality. Impressive savings in time and distance have been quoted for ships taking the 
northern routes, but time savings are dependent on the speed of steaming, which can be 
greatly reduced if ice or weather conditions are difficult. While the tanker ST1 Heritage 
apparently was able to maintain a speed of 14 knots through the NSR on its passage in 2011, 
other ships have traversed at speeds as slow at seven knots. Compared to the average speed 
of a container vessel of around 20 knots in open waters (although the fuel-saving “slow-
steaming” phenomenon also has to be factored in)27 it is apparent that shorter distances 
do not always mean faster passage. That said, although speed on any of the northern 
routes is unlikely to approach the average speeds maintained on southern routes, given 
the much shorter distances there is still the potential for meaningful fuel and time, and 
thus cost, savings, which cannot be ignored. The Nordic Orion, a Danish ice-class bulk 
carrier, saved $200,000 and four days’ transit by shipping 15,000 metric tons of coal direct 
from Vancouver to Finland via the Northwest Passage in 2013 instead of proceeding via 
Panama,28 although the voyage almost didn’t take place owing to the difficulty in arranging 
for marine insurance.
There are many reasons why the siren call of shorter distances can be offset by other 
negative factors and it is not surprising to see more balanced media coverage emerge as 
a result. The Globe and Mail, so enthusiastic in 2013, soon published a series entitled “A 
reality check on the Northwest Passage ‘boom.’”29 As Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse have 
pointed out,30 and has also been well documented in the definitive work on Arctic shipping 
by a team of researchers from the Ocean Futures Institute in Norway,31 difficulties in the 
Canadian Arctic are many: shifting ice due to winds and currents; variability in the extent 
26 Muhammed Makki, “China’s Quest for Arctic Access & Resources,” Journal of Energy Security (April 19, 2012),  
http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=351:chinas-quest-for-arctic-access-aamp-resources
&catid=123:content&Itemid=389.
27 Hong Liang Lee, “The Economics of Slow Steaming,” Seatrade Maritime News, October 7, 2014, http://www.seatrade-
maritime.com/news/americas/the-economics-of-slow-steaming.html.
28 Wendy Stueck, “Ship crosses Northwest Passage, sails into history,” The Globe and Mail, September 25, 2013,  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/bulk-carrier-becomes-first-to-successfully-traverse-northwest-
passage/article14516278/.
29 Paul Waldie, “A reality check on the Northwest Passage ‘boom,’” The Globe and Mail, January 7, 2014, http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/breakthrough/will-cold-dark-northwest-passage-see-more-ships/article16231502/.
30 Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain.”
31 Ostreng et al., Shipping.
7of ice-free waters from one season to the next; uncharted or poorly charted sea lanes;32 
and lack of port infrastructure and satisfactory icebreaking capacity. These drawbacks, 
combined with the shallow 10 metre draft on the southern Northwest Passage route,33 all 
of which are reflected in insurance rates, make it unlikely that the NWP will be the first 
choice of those wishing to develop Arctic sea routes to and from Asia.34 The history of the 
exploration of the Northwest Passage, from Hudson to Franklin, bears testament to the 
challenging conditions in the Canadian Arctic. 
SHIPPING CHALLENGES ON THE NORTHERN ROUTES
Insurance and Risks
Insurance is a major, but difficult to quantify cost factor facing shipping on both Arctic 
routes. Today, even though many of the risks associated with shipping are well known and 
understood by insurers, there are still risks related to Arctic navigation that need to be 
identified.35 Ostreng et al. point out that underwriters normally base their premiums on a 
historic loss record, and the frequency of accidents is a key element of risk. However, in 
the Arctic, a lack of empirical data and statistics makes it difficult for insurers to compose 
a risk assessment related to the probability of accidents on the various shipping routes.36 As 
a result, the provision of insurance for Arctic shipping tends to be on a case-by-case basis, 
and expensive for both property and indemnity (P & I) and hull and machinery (H & M) 
policies.37 This applies to both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. At the 
very least, the best that can be said is that availability and cost of insurance is problematic 
and will remain so for some time to come. Barring some catastrophic developments 
affecting southern shipping routes, the risk profile of transiting the Arctic will always carry 
a premium compared to other routes. 
Imbalanced Cargo Flows
One of the challenges hindering the growth of the northern routes is the difficulty in 
balancing cargo flows. In 2013, 71 vessels transited the NSR (an all-time high so far), 
32 See, for example, E.J. Stewart and J. Dawson, “A Matter of Good Fortune? The Grounding of the Clipper Adventurer in the 
Northwest Passage, Arctic Canada,” Arctic 64, 2 (June 2011), http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic64-2-263.pdf.
33 Some of the straits in the Northern Sea Route also have relatively shallow drafts. See ABS (American Bureau of Shipping), 
“Navigating the Northern Sea Route: Status and Guidance,” http://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/publications/2014/
NSR_Advisory.pdf.
34 Others are somewhat more optimistic. See, for example, Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? (Vancouver, B.C.: Douglas 
and McIntyre, 2009), 40: “There is no doubt that ships will come. … The deepwater route of the Northwest Passage could 
also accommodate super-tankers and container ships that are too large for the Panama Canal … US Navy aircraft carriers 
are also too big for the Panama Canal and may be attracted to an ice free Northwest Passage.”
35 Anne Katrine Normann and Eirik Mikkelson, “Navigating in ice in nothing new, but … : The role of insurance for use of 
the Northern Sea Route. Preliminary results,” Northern Research Institute, http://www.arcticfrontiers.com/downloads/
arctic-frontiers-2014/poster-presentations-3/part-iii-shipping-a-offshore-in-the-arctic-2/610-anne-normann-and-eirik-
mikkelsen/file.
36 Ostreng et al., Shipping.
37 Marsh Risk Management Research, “Arctic Shipping: Navigating the Risks and Opportunities” (August 2014),  
http://www.safety4sea.com/images/media/pdf/Arctic_Shipping_Lanes_MRMR_August_2014_US.pdf.
8but a further analysis reveals factors that negatively impact the route’s viability. Forty 
vessels travelled eastbound (Europe to Asia), carrying 895,000 tons of cargo and 6,000 
tons of ballast, while the 31 westbound vessels carried only 468,000 tons of cargo with 
500,000 tons of ballast. From these statistics it is evident that eastbound journeys on the 
NSR are more common, fuelled by natural resource products being shipped to Asia, with 
only limited cargo movement in the opposite direction. This cargo imbalance inevitably 
affects profitability. Moreover, the vast majority of transits originated in Russian ports (not 
being true Western Europe-to-Asia transits). At this point, statistics indicate that the NSR 
is primarily used as a domestic supply and export route for Russia and much less as an 
international transportation corridor.38 In 2014, these volumes dropped significantly39 with 
the total number of ships transiting being less than half that of the previous year.40
Icebreaking Costs
While the Northern Sea Route has seen a much greater volume of traffic than the Northwest 
Passage, the decline in NSR traffic in 2014 indicates that many obstacles still remain 
before either route can become viable commercially. Ice conditions are generally easier 
on the NSR but they are still unpredictable, requiring icebreaker services41 and travel by 
convoy. Among the principal obstacles is the cost of icebreaking services in the Russian 
Arctic. The Russian icebreaking service is mandated to operate on a cost-recovery basis, 
which currently makes the fees prohibitive, more than offsetting the fuel costs and transit 
fees (e.g., on the Suez Canal) saved by avoiding competing southern routes. With regard 
to icebreaking fees, Ostreng et al. indicate a fee of $31.70 per ton is charged for container 
cargo, and point out that each 24-ton container (TEU)42 would thus attract charges of $760 
for the NSR transit just for these fees alone. Since the current freight rate for Europe (at 
the time of publication) via Suez was $800 per TEU, assuming a similar freight cost via 
the NSR and adding the icebreaking fees effectively doubles the cost.43 The transit fees for 
using Suez have to be added into the cost comparison, but they amount only to about 10 per 
cent of the Russian icebreaking fees,44 illustrating the challenge of making the NSR a viable 
alternative route. 
Yet, at least Russia can provide the service; it has more than 40 modern icebreakers45 and 
is building 14 more, including the world’s largest nuclear-powered icebreaker due to enter 
service in 2019. Canada, by contrast, does not at present charge for icebreaking services, 
but infrastructure in the Canadian Arctic is even more basic. Icebreaking capacity is limited 
38 Malte Humpert, “Arctic Shipping: An Analysis of the 2013 Season,” Arctic Institute (October 2014). 
39 
Trude Pettersen, “Northern Sea Route Traffic Plummeted,” Barents Observer, December 16, 2014,  
http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2014/12/northern-sea-route-traffic-plummeted-16-12. 
40 
Northern Sea Route Information Office, “Transits 2014,” http://www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_transits. 
41 Andrei Smirnov, “The need for icebreakers will increase after the year 2016,” Arctic Info, October 18, 2012,  
http://www.arctic-info.com/ExpertOpinion/18-10-2012/-the-need-for-icebreakers-will-increase-after-the-year-2016.
42 TEU stands for Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit, which can be used to measure a ship’s cargo-carrying capacity. The 
dimensions of one TEU are roughly equal to that of a standard 20-foot shipping container
43 Ostreng et al., Shipping, 223.
44 ibid.
45 Milosz Reterski, “Breaking the Ice,” Foreign Affairs, December 11, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2014-12-11/breaking-ice. 
9(Canada has only two heavy icebreakers and is building one more,46 which is not due to 
enter service before 2021, while the U.S. has only one heavy icebreaker in operation). To 
compound the challenge, ice and navigation conditions are considerably more challenging 
in the Northwest Passage than on the Northern Sea Route. 
GLOBAL CHALLENGES
The challenges and opportunities discussed above regarding the future viability of Arctic 
sea routes must be examined in the broader context of developments in global maritime 
transport and world trade generally. Quite apart from the difficulties presented by the 
Arctic routes, which governments can mitigate to some extent (although they cannot control 
the weather!), the commercial future of these routes is affected by such factors as the 
competition from alternate routes; new infrastructure such as the widening of the Panama 
Canal, expansion of the Suez Canal and even, potentially, a new canal across Nicaragua; 
fuel costs; security issues; innovations in the shipping industry; and shifting patterns of 
global trade. 
New Facilities at Suez and Panama
In August of 2015, Egypt celebrated the opening of the expanded Suez Canal. Suez, which 
handles eight per cent of global trade, saw 17,148 ships with a net tonnage of 963 million 
tons transit in 2014.47 The new facilities have added a 35-kilometre channel that will 
allow ships of up to 18,000 TEU to proceed in both directions simultaneously, reducing 
waiting times by up to eight hours. Despite the publicity and Egyptian pride at opening the 
expansion two years early, serious questions remain about the utility of the expansion at this 
point, given the drop in world trade. Volumes at the canal are still 20 per cent below 2008 
levels.48 
Panama, which last year handled 13,482 ships totaling 327 million tons (or two per cent of 
world trade), is scheduled to open its new canal facilities, which will widen the locks and 
provide a new lane of traffic in 2016. The capacity of the locks will expand from being able 
to handle 5,000-TEU container vessels to vessels of up to 13,000 TEUs.49 However, despite 
the widening of the canal, the newer generation of container vessels, some with a capacity 
of up to 24,000 TEU, will not be able to use the Panama route.
46 Canadian Coast Guard website, “Icebreaking Operations Services,” www.ccg-gcc.ca/icebreaking/home.
47 
Suez Canal Authority website, “Traffic Statistics,” http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/TRstat.aspx?reportId=3.
48 Ahmed Feteha, “Egypt shows off $8 billion Suez Canal expansion that the world may not need,” Bloomberg News, August 
4, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-04/egypt-shows-off-8-billion-suez-canal-gift-world-may-not-
need.
49 Canal de Panama website, “Panama Canal Expansion,” http://micanaldepanama.com/expansion/. Suez, which has no locks, 
does not face such width limitations and can currently handle vessels up to 18,000 TEU. See, for example, Daniel Shea, 
“The New Suez Canal: Racing Against Time,” OnboardOnline, January 26, 2015, https://www.onboardonline.com/industry-
article-index/shipping/the-new-suez-canal-racing-against-time/. 
10
Global Shipping Trends
Although world trade has slowed since the 2008 financial crisis, seaborne capacity has more 
than doubled since 1990, especially in the bulk- and container-carrier segments, and the 
size of container ships has grown. Over the past two decades, container ships have become 
the fastest-growing category in comparison with bulk carriers, tankers and general cargo 
ships. In the past 15 years they have grown on average about 100 metres in length with new 
ships having a length of 400 metres, width of 60 metres and 17-metre draft, with a TEU 
capacity of 18,000.50 It is expected that 24,000-TEU-capacity ships will be travelling the 
major trading routes between Asia and Europe by 2020, but not via Suez or Panama owing 
to size limitations.51 Larger vessels reduce costs of shipping considerably; it is estimated 
that an increase of 2.5 times capacity drives cost savings in the vicinity of 30 per cent.52 
Despite the current over-capacity, the major shipping lines cannot compete without moving 
to larger ships and all are ordering new, larger vessels.53 This reality is driving substantial 
institutional and infrastructure changes in port handling facilities, and the major ports, if 
they want to stay in the game, are required to undertake costly infrastructure upgrades. 
Larger container vessels have other impacts on port operations as well, including quay 
utilization, yard space, and operation and labour costs, but larger ships do not necessarily 
mean more cargo. 
According to the World Shipping Council, nine of the world’s 10 busiest container ports are 
located in East Asia, with seven of them being in China.54 The shift to container vessels, 
the trend to larger vessels and the current over-capacity in the industry makes the northern 
routes less attractive despite the considerable savings in distance (although none of the 
northern routes faces the size constraints of both Panama and Suez.)
Larger vessels also result in the “feederizing”55 of smaller ports that do not have the 
capacity to handle the latest generation of container ships. Smaller ships operate from trans-
shipment hubs to service lower capacity ports. To be economical, these smaller ships need 
50 William Kremer, “How much bigger can container ships get?,” BBC News Magazine, February 19, 2013,  
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21432226.
51 North American west coast ports cannot handle the largest new container ships. Long Beach has recently upgraded to be 
able to handle 14,000-TEU ships. Port Metro Vancouver currently handles 11,000–12,000-TEU vessels but states that it is 
capable of handling 14,000-TEU ships. The proposed expansion at Roberts Bank will be able to accommodate up to 20,000-
TEU vessels. (Correspondence with the author, November 24, 2015).
52 I am indebted to Bernard Mazuel, secretary general of the Union des Ports de France, Dr. Hyong-Mo Jeon, Korea Maritime 
Institute, and other participants in the seminar “Meeting the Increasing Demand for Maritime Trade,” held under the 
auspices of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), in Papeete, French Polynesia, October 19–20, 2015, for 
information on global shipping trends. See http://www.pecc.org/resources/infrastructure-1/2283-major-changes-in-global-
shipping-meeting-the-demand-implications-for-port-operators/file.
53 According to a 2015 post by APM Terminals, a global operator of port facilities, there are currently 29 vessels of 18,000-
TEU capacity and above in service globally, with another 68 on order. APM Terminals, “Suez Canal Expansion,” news 
release, http://www.apmterminals.com/en/news/press-releases/2015/suez-canal-expansion.
54 The top 10 container ports in 2013 were, in order of capacity handled: Shanghai, Singapore, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Busan, 
Ningbo, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Dubai, and Tianjin. Shanghai handled 33.62 million TEUs. World Shipping Council website, 
“About the Industry,” http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports. Port 
Metro Vancouver, Canada’s largest port, handled 2.9 million TEUs in 2014. It ranks 47th on the World Shipping Council’s 
list of the top 50 ports. Port Metro Vancouver, Statistics Overview 2014, http://www.portmetrovancouver.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/03/2014-statistics-overview.pdf.
55 “Feederization” refers to the bypassing of smaller ports as container vessels get larger, with smaller ports only served by 
trans-shipment hubs and feeder services. 
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regular ports of call, with cargo drop-off and pick-up opportunities en route, for revenue 
generation. Neither the NSR nor the NWP offer any meaningful ports that could develop 
into such hubs. 
Global Trade Patterns
Finally there are changing global trading patterns to consider. A global slowdown in trade, 
combined with the growth of south-south trade,56 makes a new Arctic shipping route 
between Asia and Europe, or between Asia and the eastern North American seaboard, less 
economically significant than in the past. Since 2008, the steady growth of global trade that 
had continued unabated for several decades has slowed considerably. As stated by the Bank 
of Canada, “Global trade has been disappointing following the 2007–09 financial crisis. 
After outpacing global GDP growth in the pre-crisis era, growth in global trade slowed and 
has barely matched the lackluster pace of overall economic activity since 2010. As a result, 
the global propensity to trade (i.e., the ratio of trade to global GDP) has stopped rising.”57 
The global economy is enormously dependent on seaborne trade — and the shipping 
industry is equally dependent on robust global growth — and this mutual dependence had 
escalated rapidly in recent years. Efforts to rejuvenate global trade are an important global 
priority, but with stasis at the WTO, Europe facing its own financial crisis compounded by 
a huge refugee influx, and the Chinese economy slowing, prospects are not good. There is 
growing acceptance that slower growth may be the “new normal.”58 
Resource Shipments
If cargo and particularly container shipping is unlikely to be a significant user of the Arctic 
sea routes owing both to the physical challenges of these routes as well as shifting global 
shipping trends, one area where there is likely to be better potential for increased use 
appears to lie primarily in bulk resource shipping, with some movement of oil and gas, 
directly from sources in the Arctic to markets in Asia. In addition, there is potential for 
growth in cruise ship traffic.59 In September 2014, the MV Nunavik, operated by a Canadian 
company (Fednav), sailed unescorted from Deception Bay in northern Quebec direct to 
China via the NWP with a shipment of nickel concentrate.60 Similar shipments have been 
taking place from Siberian ports to Asia, and the Yamal gas fields in Siberia are already 
being readied to serve the Chinese market within a few years.61 There are other mineral 
56 UNCTAD, “South-South trade continues to increase,” December 16, 2013, http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.
aspx?OriginalVersionID=673.
57 Michael Francis and Louis Morel, “The Slowdown in Global Trade,” Bank of Canada Review (Spring 2015),  
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/boc-review-spring15-francis.pdf.
58 Barrie McKenna, “Slower growth new economic reality, Bank of Canada says,” The Globe and Mail, November 19, 2015, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/slower-growth-new-economic-reality-bank-of-canada-says/
article27359179/; Abeer Reza and Subrata Sarkar, “Is Slower Growth the New Normal in Advanced Economies?,” Bank of 
Canada Review (Autumn 2015), http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/boc-review-autumn15-reza.pdf.
59 Ostreng et al., Shipping, 133-141.
60 Fednav, “First Arctic cargo shipped through the Northwest Passage,” news release, September 19, 2014,  
http://www.fednav.com/en/media/first-arctic-cargo-shipped-through-northwest-passage-0.
61 Maria Bennett, “China-Russia gas deal win for the Arctic,” The Maritime Executive, July 4, 2014.
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exploitation sites in Canada, such as the Mary River iron ore mine on Baffin Island,62 that 
hold potential for shipping direct from the North through Arctic sea routes to Asia.63
Resource exploitation in the Arctic is thus the most likely source for increases in (bulk and 
tanker) shipping through the northern sea routes. However, while it is estimated that the 
Arctic could hold up to 13 per cent of the world’s conventional oil reserves and as much 
as 30 per cent of natural gas reserves,64 climate change concerns along with low oil prices 
could see the more inaccessible Arctic reserves left unexploited. The recent decision by 
Shell to cease exploration in offshore Alaska waters for the foreseeable future is an example 
of the challenges faced by companies extracting resources in the Arctic.65 Thus, one must 
exercise caution with respect to estimating the amount of bulk and tanker shipping on 
the northern sea routes that the resource sector will generate, although clearly in specific 
instances there are viable routes to be exploited.66 
IMPACT OF THE NORTHERN ROUTES ON ASIAN ECONOMIES AND TRADE  
WITH ASIA 
The World Shipping Council estimated in 2013 that of the roughly 61 million TEUs of 
containerized shipping on the world’s major trade routes, almost 37 million TEUs, or 
roughly 60 per cent, were accounted for by the routes between Asia and North America and 
Asia and North Europe, with about double the volume flowing from Asia to Europe and 
North America than the reverse.67 It is worth considering how much of this traffic could 
conceivably be routed through the Arctic under the best of circumstances. 
A recent study modelling the amount of bulk and container traffic “eligible” for shipment 
from Asia to northern Europe or North America through the Arctic pointed out that ports 
south and west of a line drawn roughly from Hong Kong to Sydney will have little or no 
distance advantage for shipping via the northern routes to Europe, and that only about 
seven per cent of the transport volume from Asian regions where the NSR has a distance 
advantage is shipped via Panama.68 However, that still leaves considerable theoretical 
62 Terrance Power and Pauline Power, Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty: Under Attack (2014), 12.
63 
Baffinland’s Mary River mine shipped its first ore to Europe in July 2015. Baffinland website, “Location and Project 
History,” http://www.baffinland.com/the-project/location-and-project-history/?lang=en.
64 Energy Information Administration, “Today in Energy,” January 20, 2012, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=4650. This source is based on a study done by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in 2008 that completed an 
assessment of undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources in all areas north of the Arctic Circle. Using a geology-based 
probabilistic methodology, the USGS estimated the occurrence of undiscovered oil and gas in 33 geologic provinces thought 
to be prospective for petroleum. The sum of the mean estimates for each province indicates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 
1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in the Arctic, 
of which approximately 84 per cent is expected to occur in offshore areas. Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource 
Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle” (2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
65 Shell website, “Shell updates on Alaska exploration,” news release, September 28, 2015, http://www.shell.com/global/
aboutshell/investor/news-and-library/2015/shell-updates-on-alaska-exploration.html. 
66 Teck’s Red Dog lead and zinc mine in northwest Alaska is one example. 
67 World Shipping Council website, “Trade routes,” http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/trade-
routes.
68 Patrick Leypoldt, “The Capacity Potential of the Northern Sea Route by 2015,” in Northern Sea Route: A Comprehensive 
Analysis, ed. Marcus Matthias Keupp (Berlin: Springer, 2015).
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potential for shipping via either of the Arctic routes from northern China, Japan and Korea, 
based on distance savings. 
Two Korean researchers conducted a study looking at the potential number of voyages for 
trans-shipment of Korean container cargo by size of ship under simplified assumptions 
that the NSR was fully navigable and economical enough for shipping and could substitute 
1:1 for passages through the Suez Canal. Assuming that the NSR stayed ice-free for three 
months a year, they concluded that the number of voyages from Korea to the seven major 
European destinations69 would range from a high of 682 for vessels of only 650-TEU 
capacity to 56 for 8,000-TEU-capacity vessels.70 While this is a considerable increase from 
the maximum number of vessels that transited the NSR in its peak year, 2013 (71 vessels), 
it is important to note that these estimates do not take into account any of the obstacles 
inhibiting use of the northern sea routes, from ice conditions to economic viability. When 
these are factored in, despite the hyperbole about the likelihood of increased use of the NSR 
— and to a lesser extent the NWP — as an alternative freight route for Asian products to 
Europe and eastern North America, one is drawn to the conclusion that the prospect of a 
major shift in container cargo shipping patterns is slight. 
China in particular will nonetheless continue to demonstrate an active interest in pursuing 
shipping options across the Arctic,71 but it is difficult to conceive that any of the northern 
passages will become major game-changers for Asian economies in terms of movement of 
freight in the foreseeable future (20 to 25 years or longer), even assuming continued melting 
of the permanent sea ice. For China, there are strategic and political reasons as well as 
economic factors leading it to continue to express interest in Arctic shipping, and China can 
be expected to continue to do so in part to justify its Arctic engagement.72 
However, while shipping of container freight via the northern sea routes may not have a 
major impact on Asian economies, both the NSR and NWP offer cost-efficient alternatives 
for the supply of resources directly from the Arctic to Asia, assuming market and climatic 
conditions allow for economic exploitation and recovery of oil, gas and other resources in 
these inhospitable regions. In sum, there is likely to be more rhetoric than reality in terms 
of these routes being viable alternatives for shipping cargo, especially containers, to and 
from the Asian market. Despite this reality, the opportunities for Canada to use its Arctic 
presence and the NWP to develop and strengthen its relations with Asia-Pacific economies, 
particularly China, should not be underestimated. 
69 Russia, Germany, Netherlands, the U.K., Belgium, Poland and France.
70 Yeong-seok Ha and Jung-soo Seo, “The Northern Sea Routes and Korea’s Trade with Europe: Implications for Korea’s 
Shipping Industry,” International Journal of e-Navigation and Maritime Economy 1 (2014): 73-84, http://ac.els-cdn.com/
S2405535214000084/1-s2.0-S2405535214000084-main.pdf?_tid=238b6de4-d75e-11e5-80a3-00000aab0f26&acdnat=145592
3682_76d1fe8fb6a33931c31119067951288b.
71 “COSCO announces Arctic shipping route to Europe,” Japan Times, October 27, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2015/10/27/asia-pacific/cosco-announces-arctic-shipping-route-europe/#.VlOGbFOFNAh.
72 See, for example, David Wright, “The Panda Readies to Meet the Polar Bear: China and Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty 
Challenge” (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011). 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA
For Canada to play a meaningful role with Asia based on its Arctic presence, it will need to 
invest in building the infrastructure in the North that will allow it to exercise sovereignty 
through providing vital services like meteorological forecasting and search and rescue. So 
far there has been more talk than action73 with regard to Canada’s northern strategy, which 
was laid out in 2009.74 Of the four pillars of the strategy (exercising sovereignty, promoting 
economic and social development, protecting the environment, and improving governance), 
all are potentially affected by even a modest growth in Arctic shipping. The 2013 transit 
of the Nordic Orion was encouraged by the Canadian government, which waived all 
icebreaking fees. Promises were made by the previous Conservative government to invest 
in and improve infrastructure. Commitments to new icebreakers have been scaled back, 
however, and little search and rescue capacity exists in the North.75 
NORDIC ORION TRANSIT
73 Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain.”
74 Government of Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Ottawa, 2009).
75 Emma Jarratt, “Canada Slow to deliver on Arctic commitments,” Barents Observer, November 27, 2014,  
http://barentsobserver.com/en/2014/11/canada-slow-deliver-arctic-commitments-27-11.
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For Canada to use its claimed ownership of the NWP to promote closer ties with Asia, 
a reasonable goal given Asian and particularly Chinese interest in Arctic shipping, it 
will need to up its game in terms of commitments to make that route a safe and viable 
navigational option. Canada cannot change the rate of sea-ice reduction or the weather, nor 
can it make the geography of the NWP more user-friendly, but it can make the necessary 
investments so that human infrastructure is in place to complement whatever changes 
nature may bring. 
The question then arises as to what role can the Arctic play in Canada’s relations with 
Asia? The Arctic Council is a forum where Canada has a permanent seat at the table, 
unlike in some Asia-Pacific fora where it is not present. As noted, five Asian countries have 
become observers to the council on the basis of their environmental, shipping, resource and 
strategic interests. As the new Liberal government seeks to recalibrate its relations with 
Asia, it will need to identify common interests that Canada shares with its Asian partners 
— and the Arctic offers an excellent vehicle to do this.
On the trade and investment file, Canada is likely to revive the Canada-China 
Complementarities Study, and move toward the negotiation of a free-trade or economic-
partnership agreement with China. In 2014, Canada concluded the Canada-Korea Free 
Trade Agreement and is a participant in the just-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
of which both Japan and Singapore are members. Canada also continues to work on an 
economic-partnership agreement with India. To these closer economic ties Canada will 
want to add other elements to strengthen the fabric of bilateral relations. Among these 
will be security, cultural, educational and scientific linkages. The Arctic is an area where 
shared goals of environmental protection, safer navigation, and resource development 
offer opportunities for constructive dialogue and engagement. As Lackenbauer points 
out with respect to the new Asian observers to the Arctic Council, “Canada should seize 
the heightened interest in and expanded dialogue on Arctic affairs as a way to correct 
misperceptions about the region and promote Ottawa’s vision of regional protection and 
sustainable development.”76 
China, while among the most active of the Asian players in the Arctic, is by no means the 
only one engaged in the region. Canada and Korea upgraded their bilateral relationship 
in 2014 to a “strategic partnership.” A strategic partnership indicates that two countries 
consider their bilateral relationship to be one of their key foreign engagements, and that 
they will give priority to developing and strengthening bilateral ties. Among the areas 
where Canada and Korea committed to develop closer relations was Arctic research 
and development, along with energy and natural resources, and science, technology and 
innovation.77 Korea’s Maritime Institute, for example, is currently undertaking research into 
Arctic issues in the following areas: 1) the establishment of Arctic master plans and follow-
up policies; 2) Arctic governance, resource development and new policy demand-response 
capacity-building; 3) resource-linkage logistics systems throughout the Arctic Ocean; and 
76 Lackenbauer, “Canada and,” 29.
77 Government of Canada, “Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Korean President Park Geun-hye Celebrate Signing of 
Historic Free Trade Agreement and Launch of Strategic Partnership,” news release, September 22, 2014,  
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/korea-coree/highlights-faits/2014/FT-LE-2014.aspx?lang=eng.
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4) polar science and industry convergence.78 That is a more-than-full menu for bilateral 
co-operation. Japan has its own National Institute of Polar Research79 and, as noted above, 
China has an extremely active research program. 
Resource exploration in the Canadian Arctic will require careful environmental 
stewardship and massive investment. Asian investment in Canada has not been without 
controversy, notably those investments made by Chinese state-owned enterprises. This 
was particularly pronounced during the Investment Canada review of the acquisition of 
the Canadian oil firm Nexen by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
in 2012. In 2014, the bilateral Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(FIPA) with China came into effect, generating both praise and criticism. China and 
Korea are investors in the open-pit iron ore mine at Arcelor Mittal’s Mary River site on 
Baffin Island,80 and more Asian investment can be expected. Attitudes toward Asian 
investment polled by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada in its annual National Opinion 
Poll in 2014 showed growing apprehension about developing closer ties with Asia,81 but a 
redefinition of the poll questions in 2015 produced markedly different results, with attitudes 
toward Japanese investment scoring higher positive ratings among public opinion than 
even investment from the U.S.82 This indicates that, while there are concerns regarding 
concentration of foreign investment in Canada, particularly in the resource area, there is 
also an understanding of the need for such investment and the prosperity that it can bring. 
Moreover, public attitudes are not immutably fixed and are influenced by perceptions often 
unrelated to economic arguments. A positive engagement with Asia in the Arctic will help 
build popular acceptance of more Asian investment in Canada generally and in the Arctic 
specifically. 
While environmental impact and investment considerations are important, control and de 
facto jurisdiction over the shipping lanes of the NWP is a key asset that Canada holds in its 
dealings with Asian countries. Although the likelihood of the NWP becoming an important 
trans-shipment route to Asia is remote, changing climatic conditions, market factors, and 
strategic considerations all require that Canada dedicate policy and financial resources to 
maintain and maximize the value of this asset as Russia has done with its development of 
the NSR. Canada needs to catch up, and in the process can give further substance to its 
claim to be an important and engaged player in the Asia-Pacific region.
78 Korea Maritime Institute, Strategy Research Division (2015), 25. 
79 National Institute for Polar Research website, “About NIPR,” http://www.nipr.ac.jp/english/outline/index.html.
80 Power and Power, Canada’s Arctic, 12.
81 
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2014 National Opinion Poll (Vancouver, 2014), https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/
files/filefield/national_opinion_poll_2014_final_0.pdf.
82 Hugh Stephens, “Attitudes to Asian investment: It all depends on the context,” China-US Focus, August 11, 2015,  
http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/attitudes-to-asian-investment-it-all-depends-on-the-context/.
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THE COSTLIEST TAX OF ALL: RAISING REVENUE THROUGH CORPORATE TAX HIKES CAN BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR THE PROVINCES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/costliest-tax-all-raising-revenue-through-corporate-tax-hikes-can-be-counter-productive-prov
Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | March 2016
CUTTING PROVINCIAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/cutting-provincial-corporate-income-tax-rates-promote-investment-employment-and-economic-gro
Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | March 2016
INTO THE MIRE: A CLOSER LOOK AT FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/mire-closer-look-fossil-fuel-subsidies
Radoslaw Stefanski | March 2016
THE ISSUE OF SOCIAL LICENCE AND ENERGY UTILITY PLANNING AND INVESTMENT
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/issue-social-licence-and-energy-utility-planning-and-investment
Michal C. Moore | March 2016
IS SOCIAL LICENCE A LICENCE TO STALL?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/social-licence-licence-stall
Mark Lowey | March 2016
